Abstract
Introduction
Privacy is an increasingly important requirement in identity management systems. Consider a scenario where a user A is interacting with a service provider B who sells goods online. In a privacy enhancing environment, A can be conditionally anonymous. For security and accountability purposes, B needs an assurance that under certain conditions (such as in a situation whereby B realizes that the goods sold have serious health and safety concerns and therefore needs to contact A), B can obtain the necessary private information about A so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken. We call this scenario conditional revelation of private information -CRPI [2] .
The private credential system (PCS) [2] has been proposed to address such a scenario. The PCS approach is to encrypt private information in such a way that only a trusted third party (also known as the anonymity revocation manager -ARM ) can decrypt the escrowed private information when a set of conditions attached to the encrypted text is satisfied, and B can verify that the encrypted text (which was encrypted under the ARM 's public key) contains the correct private information that has been certified by some trusted entities without learning the value of the private information itself. We call such encryption verifiable.
These cryptographic schemes demonstrate that cryptographic primitives can be usefully applied to the CRPI problem. However, they place too much trust on ARM . An ARM may decrypt the escrowed information, even when the attached conditions remain unfulfilled: the attached conditions are not enforceable except through the 'trust' that the ARM can properly and honestly assess the fulfillment of the attached conditions. One attempt to address such a trust problem is proposed in [14] whereby PCS is combined with universal custodian-hiding verifiable encryption (UCHVE) -we henceforth call this approach UCHVE-PCS. The UCHVE-PCS approach in [14] distributes the trust between the ARM and a set of referees. However, the UCHVE-PCS approach [14] has accountability and efficiency problems. If A's private information is misused, it is not clear as to who is responsible for such misuse because the UCHVE-PCS approach allows any one of the referees, ARM or B to learn A's private information. In addition, UCHVE-PCS [14] suffers from severe computational inefficiency due to the large number of online modular exponentiations that need to be performed. This paper proposes a new mechanism to improve the UCHVE-PCS approach [14] by using an existing proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme proposed by Ateniese et al (2006) [1] . PRE has been used in the area of secure file storage, access control, and delegations. To our knowledge, this is the first time that PRE has been used to enhance privacy and improve accountability in a privacy-enhancing environment (such as CRPI) where parties mutually distrust each other. Informally, PRE allows an entity (such as a proxy) that possesses a re-encryption key from A to B (denoted as rk A→B ) to transform a ciphertext Cipher a (which was originally encrypted for A) to another ciphertext Cipher b , which can be directly decrypted by B without the proxy learning anything about the content of Cipher a . Details of the re-encryption scheme [1] are provided in section 2. 1 However, the PRE scheme [1] cannot be readily applied to solve the CRPI scenario. The PRE scheme [1] assumes that the proxy is trusted and will not abuse its power to re-encrypt ciphertexts. Such assumption of a trusted third party is precisely what we do not want to have. Therefore, in order to use PRE, we need to firstly propose a protocol to securely distribute a one-time reencryption key rk A→B . Then, we propose a method to combine PRE with PCS to remove the need of a single trusted entity (such as ARM ), and to provide better accountability and efficiency as compared to the UCHVE-PCS approach [14] .
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are: (1) A new protocol that provides the secure release of re-encryption key rk A→B for PRE scheme [1] -we henceforth call this protocol the Re-encryption Key Distribution protocol (RKD). RKD adds to the existing PRE scheme [1] a secure way to distribute the reencryption key (in [1] , no protocol is provided on how a re-encryption key should be distributed), (2) a method to apply the RKD protocol with PCS so that it removes the need for a single trusted entity, and provides better accountability and efficiency -we henceforth call this combination RKD-PCS, and (3) a brief performance analysis of RKD-PCS to show that it is more efficient than the UCHVE-PCS approach [14] .
Application RKD-PCS can be usefully applied in environments where privacy is important, such as in the medical field. Users generally prefer to be anonymous and have their health information private, while at the same time, certain conditions -such as when a user has been diagnosed with a highly infectious disease -require the user's anonymity and private information to be revoked. In addition, given that medical information is generally regarded as sensitive, we also want to ensure the accountability of such revocation capability action to prevent the abuse of such revocation capability. RKD-PCS provides the necessary properties to be applicable in such an environment. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the cryptographic primitives that RKD uses. Section 3 describes the RKD protocol. Section 4 provides the details of RKD-PCS system. Section 5 provides a brief analysis of the performance of RKD-PCS.
Cryptographic Schemes and Notations
The cryptographic schemes that will be used in RKD are briefly explained. Readers who are interested in the details, including security proofs, should refer to the original papers referenced. 
Notation
Let a mapping e :
ab , and (3) the map is non-degenerate: if
Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
A proxy re-encryption scheme allows a proxy that possesses the appropriate re-encryption key rk X→Y to transform a ciphertext that was originally encrypted for an entity X, to the one that can be decrypted by another entity Y , but reveals nothing about the plaintext to the proxy. Normally, we call X the delegator and Y the delegatee. A delegator supplies the appropriate reencryption key to the proxy.
There are several re-encryption schemes, such as [1, 11] . In this paper, the RKD is based on the proxy reencryption scheme proposed in [1] . 2 A brief description of the re-encryption scheme proposed in [1] is provided: the system parameters for the PRE scheme [1] are random generators g ∈ G 1 and Z = e(g, g) ∈ G 2 . X's public keys are pk x = (Z x1 , g x2 ), and the secret keys sk x = (x 1 , x 2 ). The value g x2 is only needed when X is willing to be a delegatee. Also assume a delegatee Y with the public keys (Z y1 , g y2 ) and secret keys sk y = (y 1 , y 2 ). Knowing g y2 , X can generate a re-encryption key rk X→Y : (g y2 ) x1 . There are two types of encryptions in this scheme: first-level and second-level encryption. A message encrypted using the first-level encryption algorithm can only be decrypted by X, therefore, it cannot be reencrypted. A message encrypted using the second-level encryption algorithm can be decrypted by X and can be re-encrypted to a delegatee (such as Y ). To do first-level encryption of a message m ∈ G 2 under pk x , compute 
. Such re-encryption scheme is single-hop: a reencrypted message must be in its first-level encryption format, and therefore cannot be re-encrypted further. Whiel this may be a limitation, in some applicationssuch as in a privacy-enhanced environment, the singlehop property is very useful as an assurance that a reencrypted message can only be decrypted by the chosen delegatee, not anybody else.
Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing
Feldman's verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme [9] is as follows: assume a secret s which is 'distributed' to n participants by giving each participant a 'share' of the secret. To construct the secret s, any t + 1 out of n (t ≤ n − 1) shares have to be collected before s can be reconstructed. Any t or less will not reveal any valuable information of s.
The public parameters required to share s is a group Z q with prime order q, and g ∈ Z q . To share s so that any t + 1 participants can reconstruct it, compute a random polynomial of degree t:
, where a 0 = s. Then compute the commitments: r i = g ai mod p for i = 0, 1, ..., t. The values r 0 , r 1 , ..., r t are made public. Each participant j (j = 1, 2, ..., n) is given a share calculated as: s j = Q(j). Each participant j can verify that it has received a correct share w.r.t s by verifying that
As long as there are at least t+1 of the shares, s can be recovered using the Shamir's secret sharing algorithm [12] .
An interesting property of Feldman's VSS scheme is that the value of r 0 = g a0 = g s is known to the public. While this has been criticized as a weakness (since r 0 leaks information about s), as we shall see in RKD, this is the property we want. While r 0 leaks information about s, the value of s still cannot be recovered due to the hardness of the discrete log problem.
A New Re-encryption Key Distribution Protocol (RKD)
The entities involved in RKD are: A -the delegator, and whose rk A→B is to be protected, B -the delegatee, and a group of referees R. As the existing PRE scheme [1] provides no details on how rk A→B can be distributed, RKD is thus proposed to fill this gap.
RKD allows a re-encryption key rk A→B for the PRE scheme in [1] to be securely distributed from A to B, removing the need for a trusted 'proxy'. RKD has two stages: the Initiation stage, which is used to distribute some information required to form the re-encryption key amongst B and the referees (note that step 1 to 3 of the RKD Initiation stage are not part of the existing PRE scheme [1] ), and the Construction stage, which is used to construct the re-encryption key rk A→B from the information distributed earlier.
Security Requirements of RKD
For RKD, we use the well-known basic security requirements based on [3] , with slight modifications.
Main requirement Implicit key authentication: this property is achieved when A is assured that only B can form the re-encryption key rk A→B .
Desirable requirements Known-key security: in a session, this property is achieved when implicit key authentication is still attainable in the face of adversaries who manage to learn the previous sessions re-encryption keys. Unknown key-share security: an adversary C must not be able to deceive A into believing that he is distributing the re-encryption key to B, while it is actually C whom A is distributing the key to. Forward secrecy: if long-term private keys of the entities are compromised, the secrecy of the previous encrypted messages are not affected. Half forward secrecy is the situation whereby the adversary only compromises one entity's private key. Key-compromise impersonation security: if an adversary C obtains B's long term private key, it is obvious that C can impersonate as B. However, this property states that in such a situation, C must not be able to impersonate as another party D to B.
As RKD involves the referees, and as A and B do not trust each other, few additional requirements are needed: Zero-knowledge Referee: referees must not learn any information for the purpose of forming other re-encryption keys with A as the delegator. Correctness: B must be able to verify A's correct behavior as per the protocol, that is, we do not want A to be able to behave in such a way that the re-encryption key cannot be correctly generated by B even after B is authorized to do so. By 'authorized', we mean the situation where there are t+1 referees who agree that B can generate the re-encryption key. Private key secrecy: we do not want B (or the referees) to learn the value of sk a because knowing such value defeats the accountability property that RKD provides (detailed discussion in section 4.3). While sk a by definition is private, a badly designed RKD may, as a result unintentionally reveal sk a to B (recall that a reencryption key contains information of A's private key).
We assume the following RKD threat environment:
• Dishonest B who will attempt to obtain the reencryption key rk A→B whenever it can.
• Dishonest A (user) who may provide false information such that rk A→B cannot be formed properly
• Honest referees (R h ⊂ R) with a small subset of at most
R dh may collude amongst themselves to try to obtain enough information to generate a new reencryption key rk A→R dh . Referees want to protect their reputations.
A and B do not trust each other. We allow collusion among dishonest referees. Dishonest referees may collude with B. No collusion between A and B (or R dh ) as such collusion is unlikely due to their conflicting interests (A wants to protect his/her private information, while B, and R dh want to reveal such information).
RKD -Initiation stage
Assume A has the following public and private key pair: pk a = Z a1 , sk a = a 1 . B has the following key pair: 
. B also verifies that the discrete log value of z 0 is indeed r by calculating:
(a) If the above verification succeeds, then B only knows that the multiplication of the discrete log value of z 0 and z 1 must result in a 1 b 2 while the value of a 1 remains hidden (due to the discrete log problem).
(b) If the above verification fails, stops.
4.
A then shares the secret value r, in relation to z 0 among n referees (here, we use the term proxies and referees interchangeably). We can use the Feldman's VSS scheme to share the discrete log of z 0 . In particular, we need to have the value of r 0 = g r = z 0 , and that the value of r 0 , r 1 , ...r t that A provides to all of the n referees are consistent. 
Security Analysis
The proposed RKD protocol achieves the implicit key authentication, known-key security, unknown key-share security, correctness, and zero-knowledge referee properties under the assumptions that the discrete log (DL) and bilinear discrete log (BDL) problem are hard, and that there are at most t dishonest referees. The half forward secrecy property is also achieved. BDL problem can be defined as follows: given (g, g x , g y ), find z such that e(g x , g y ) = e(g, g) z . Please refer to the full version of this paper [13] for the details.
One-time Re-encryption Key
At the end of RKD, the value of rk A→B is revealed to B. Consequently, B can now re-encrypt and then decrypt all of A's 2nd-level encrypted messages (recall that 2nd-level encrypted messages using the PRE scheme proposed by Ateniese 2006 [1] can be re-encrypted, while 1st-level encrypted messages cannot -see section 2.1). Therefore, it is crucial that A only uses the key pair pk a , sk a once only. This may appear to be a limitation, however, as we are operating in a privacy-enhancing environment, such one-time key use requirement is almost inevitable in order to achieve unlinkability property between session: if A uses the same public key to encrypt messages over multiple sessions, then it is trivial to link these sessions to the same user A. Therefore, using a one-time re-encryption key pair is in fact essential in a privacy-enhancing environment.
Using RKD with PCS for Conditional Revelation of Private Data Items
In this section, we show how we can use RKD with PCS. First, we briefly describes PCS in more detail, including the additional notations. Next, we show how RKD can be applied to the PCS scheme explained earlier, and show the advantages and disadvantages of this approach as compared to the UCHVE-PCS approach [14] in terms of security and performance.
More Notation A commitment c mi of a data item m i is generated using a Commit algorithm, along with a random value r: c mi = Commit(m i , r) . A commitment is hiding if it does not show any computational information on m i , and binding if it is computationally impossible to find another m i and r as inputs to the same Commit algorithm that gives a value c mi = c mi .
refers to a zero knowledge proof interactive protocol (P K). P K is executed between a Prover and a Verifier. The data on the left of the colon m a is the data item that a Prover needs to prove the knowledge of such that the statements on the right side of the colon, F (m a , m b . ..m i ) = 1, is correct. A verifier will not learn the data on the left hand side of the colon, while other parameters are known. The actual protocol involves one or more message exchange(s). At the end of the protocol, a verifier will be convinced (or not) that the prover has the knowledge of m a without the verifier learning it. 
Private Credential System
The private credential system (PCS) proposed in [2] provides many useful privacy-enhancing services. For the purpose of this paper, only the 'conditional revelation of private data items' is elaborated.
In PCS, unlike the 'usual' certificate (such as X509 certificate), a certificate Cert 1 issued to a user u a is a signature of Certif icateIssuer 1 over a collection of data items (m a , m b , . ..m j ) using one of the CamenischLysyanskaya signature schemes [5, 6] :
The conditional revelation of these private data items (m a , ...m j ) is accomplished as follows: assume we need to escrow private data items m a ...m e , and reveal m f ...m j to B.
The data items m a ...m e are blinded using a commitment scheme, for example, c a = Commit(m a , r) . Then, each of the value m a ...m e (which are hidden in c a ...c e ) is encrypted using the Camenisch-Shoup verifiable encryption scheme (CSVE) [7] under the ARM public encryption key, along with a set of pre- [5, 6] depending on which signature scheme was used to generate Cert 1 is -see [5, 6] 
The above protocol allows a user to provide a verifiable encryption of m a ...m e without the verifier learning its value and still be convinced that the ciphertexts contain the correct value. However, Cipher CSV E−ma ...Cipher CSV E−me can be trivially decrypted by the ARM without the user's knowledge, and there is no enforcement of Conditions fulfillment. Our RKD protocol, combined with the existing PCS, seeks to rectify this problem.
Applying RKD to PCS
In this section, we show how RKD can be combined with PCS to improve its conditional revelation of private data items capability. RKD-PCS consists of the setup stage, private information escrow stage, key escrow stage, and finally the revocation stage.
Setup For the purpose of this paper, consider that a user A has Cert 1 which B accepts as a source of the user's personal information. Cert 1 is verified using the verification key K (b) Generates a one-time key pair for CSVE scheme [7] : (K 
Key Escrow
As per the key specifications of the CSVE scheme [7] , K A privCSV E is composed of three components: x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , each one of them is related to the public keys in a discrete log relationship:
and several other public key components are chosen according to the key generation algorithm detailed in [7] 3 . For the sake of simplicity, we can make PRE scheme verifiable by encrypting x 1 , x 2 , x 3 using PRE scheme and provide the corresponding proofs of correct encryption generated according to the verifiable encryption scheme proposed in [4] . 4 Such proofs can be executed in a non-interactive fashion.
Therefore, x 1 , x 2 , x 3 are escrowed as follows:
1. A generates another one-time key pair for the PRE scheme. Public keys:
and the secret keys:
2. A encrypts x 1 , x 2 , x 3 using the PRE scheme and generate the proof according to [4] :
3.
A sends Cipher P RE−x1,2,3 + P roof s to B 4. B verifies that Cipher P RE−x1,2,3 are correct encryptions of x 1 , x 2 , x 3 using the provided P roof s.
Start the Initiation part of the RKD protocol
Revocation For revocation of the escrowed private information, the following steps are performed: 
Accountability in RKD-PCS
The accountability property of RKD-PCS is the result of the zero-knowledge referees, implicit key authentication, and correctness properties of RKD. The zeroknowledge referee property allows the referees to be 'free of responsibility' as even when there are more than t + 1 dishonest referees, the knowledge of r reveals no information about g a1 or a 1 -this provides a disincentive for them to misbehave. The correctness and implicit key authentication property means that as a result of executing RKD, B can only generate rk A→B , and not any other re-encryption key. Finally, the private key secrecy property states that the value of a 1 is never revealed.
These properties provide the strong basis that the only person who can decrypt Cipher P RE−x1,2,3 must be B as B is the only entity who can calculate the re-encryption key rk A→B , thus forming Cipher P REA→B −x1, 2, 3 .
This accountability property gives an assurance that it is only B who can learn the user's escrowed private information (such as Cipher CSV E−ma and Cipher CSV E−m b ). Referees assist B. However, the referees do not learn any valuable information in the process (in contrast to threshold encryption scheme (such as [8] ) whereby the referees can learn the plaintext value as long as a certain threshold is reached). This is an improvement from the UCHVE-PCS approach [14] whereby no such accountability feature is provided.
In the full version of this paper [13] , we show that even if we relax the assumption to allow t + 1 referees to collude with B, the accountability property still holds.
Security Applying RKD into PCS comes with some security trade-offs. Please refer to the full version of this paper for details [13] 
Efficiency and Performance of RKD-PCS
Some optimizations for RKD-PCS are explained in this section to achieve better efficiency, focusing on reducing the number of resoruce-intensive online modular exponentiation -modex operations required. With these optimizations, we show that RKD-PCS is more efficient than UCHVE-PCS approach [14] -thus better suited for users using limited-power devices. Please refer to the full version of this paper at [13] for details.
